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Abstracts 
This paper traced the historical developments of monetary intrgration of West African 
and discussed the OCA theory and properties. Similarities in inflation is one of the 
properties of an optimum currency area (OCA). Literatures on inflation (as a property of 
an OCA) have been able to spell out the implications of inflation rates similarities among 
members or would-be members of a monetary union. This paper therefore aimed 
principally at the examination of  the homogeneity in the patterns of inflation across the 
West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) consisiting of Guines and the Anglophone West 
African countries (comprising of  The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone); 
as well as investigating the degree of inflation deviations from some benchmarks.   Annual 
data of consumer price index and GDP deflator inflation for the WAMZ countries, the 
United States (US) and the EMU employed here spans between 1980 and 2015. Data 
analyses were performed in six stages to assess inflation convergence, majorly by 
checking the feasibility of exchange fixation in the monetary zone through the measure 
of absolute inflation rate differentials generated by the deviations of the WAMZ's 
individual member's inflation rate from: (i) the US and the Eurozone's inflation rates, (ii) 
the convergence criterion policy inflation target rate of 5%, and (iii) the WAMZ's average 
inflation over a convergence 12-year period. These were further to some necessary 
correlation studies. These properties of integration of inflation rate differentials are very 
revealing for inflation rate convergence among WAMZ member countries. From the 
evaluations, there were evidences to suggest that The Gambia is the most country feasible for 
the exchange rate integration and fixation with the euro and the US dollars while Nigeria, the 
lead economy yielded unfavourable results in the inflation evaluation. Empirical findings also 
suggested that shocks to inflationary trends in the WAMZ would have permanent and long 
lasting effects on inflation rates in the zone as inflation may not return to the trend path 
overtime. This denote that the cost implications of following disinflationary policies in 
WAMZ countries may be high while it is very likely to be difficult forecasting or predicting 
future inflation movements which are based on past inflationary behaviours. 
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1. Background 
In 2000, the West African Monetary Zone, consisting of The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, was formally established. The expectation was the 
formation of WAMZ would propelled the institution of a monetary union which would be 
characterised by a common central bank and a single currency (the eco), meant to replace 
the existing national currencies of members. The desire to fasten the process of the 
monetary integration of the African sub-region was indicated by the 15-member 
countries of the ECOWAS in 2000. This crystallised into a 2-phase programme for the 
creation of a single currency for the region. The idea was that the WAMZ (of the 
Anglophone West African countries and Guinea) will merge will merge with the existing 
West African CFA zone franc shared by members of the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) to form a formidable monetary union across the whole of 
West Africa in the future as part of the African Economic Community’s six-stage process 
of achieving a monetary union and a single currency for Africa by 2028. The proposed 
monetary union failed to commence after some few attempts, the last of which was in 
2015. The first phase of the plan was the launching of a single currency to be known as ‘eco’ by members of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) while the second phase 
was the merger of the WAMZ with the existing WAEMU to evolve a single currency for 
the whole of ECOWAS member states by January 2020. 
There were four quantitative primary convergence criteria for countries within the 
WAMZ: (i) single digit inflation rate by 2000 and inflation rate of 5% by 2003; (ii) budget 
deficit (excluding grants) of not more than 5% of GDP by 2000 and 4% by 2002; (iii) central bank financing of budget deficit to be limited to 10% of previous year’s tax 
revenue; and (iv) gross external reserves to cover at least three months of imports by the 
end of 2000 and six months by end-2003. Additional six secondary convergence criteria 
to be observed in support of the primary convergence criteria are: no accumulation of 
new domestic payment arrears and liquidation of all old arrears; tax revenue should not 
be less than 20% of the GDP; wage bill should not be less than 35% of tax revenue; 
domestically financed public investment should be at least 20% of tax revenue; the 
central parity of nominal exchange rate determined on 31 December, 2003 should be 
maintained with 15 per cent fluctuation band as defined by WAMZ Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM-II); maintenance of positive real interest rates. 
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Table 1: WAMZ Members' Primary Convergence Criteria Attainments (2000-2014) 
Budget Deficit/GDP (….should be ≤ 4%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 3.6 9.8 9.1 5.2 9.9 8.4 2.7 1.1 4.2 8.6 2.7 4.2 4.6 8.8 9.1 
Ghana 10.1 13.2 8.3 7.5 8.1 6.9 12.9 1.4 19.5 12.4 5.9 0.9 5.9 8.2 6.4 
Guinea 5.2 3.4 6.2 8.8 5.9 1.6 2.0 0.9 1.7 7.5 14.3 2.9 3.7 3.1 3.9 
Liberia 0.9 1.9 1.0 3.7 4.4 0.9 -3.0 3.4 2.0 2.0 -4.2 -0.6 -4.2 -1.0 -2.0 
Nigeria 2.7 5.8 5.9 2.8 17.0 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.2 3.3 3.8 5.0 2.6 2.7 1.0 
S/Leone 17.3 16.7 16.5 19.4 14.3 9.5 8.5 5.0 7.0 11.0 5.2 5.0 5.6 1.5 3.4 
Inflation Rates (….should be ≤5% or 0.05) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 0.2 8.1 13.0 17.6 8.0 1.8 1.4 6.0 6.8 2.7 5.0 4.8 4.3 5.7 5.6 
Ghana 40.5 21.3 15.2 23.6 11.8 13.9 10.9 12.8 18.1 16.0 14.7 8.7 9.2 11.6 15.5 
Guinea 7.2 5.2 6.1 12.9 27.6 29.7 39.1 12.8 13.5 7.9 15.5 21.4 15.2 11.9 9.7 
Liberia 3.2 19.4 11.1 5.0 16.1 7.0 8.9 11.7 9.4 7.8 7.3 8.5 7.7 7.6 9.9 
Nigeria 14.5 16.4 12.1 23.8 10.0 11.6 8.5 6.6 15.1 12.0 12.4 10.8 12.2 8.5 8.0 
S/Leone -28.0 3.4 -1.3 11.3 14.4 13.1 7.3 13.8 12.3 12.0 17.1 16.0 12.9 10.4 7.1 
Central Bank Financing (….should be ≤10% RF) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 0.0 80.7 22.0 63.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.9 13.7 14.9 12.6 0.4 na 41.0 
Ghana 57.9 0.0 12.1 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.0 9.2 11.0 
Guinea 24.0 -0.7 24.5 14.6 26.2 -8.8 54.0 0.0 5.8 38.7 91.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Liberia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Nigeria 0.0 29.3 0.0 19.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
S/Leone 0.0 8.9 0.0 26.4 0.0 0.0 13.3 0.8 0.3 18.6 37.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 7.6 
Gross External Reserves (….should be ≥6 months) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gambia 7.5 7.2 2.9 3.1 4.7 5.2 4.9 4.4 4.3 6.5 6.8 6.1 4.8 na 3.7 
Ghana 0.8 1.2 2.3 4.1 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.9 2.2 4.4 3.7 3.15 0.03 3.5 4.2 
Guinea 2.2 2.8 2.3 1.6 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.4 1.1 1.0 4.2 3.7 3.1 3.4 3.1 
Liberia 3.6 2.6 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 4.3 3.3 2.2 2.4 3.0 
Nigeria 13.6 11.3 9.9 8.5 16.1 11.8 15.1 17.4 15.3 13.0 7.9 6.3 9.5 8.9 7.4 
S/Leone 2.8 2.3 3.1 1.7 3.3 4.8 4.9 5.1 4.2 6.2 1.9 2.56 2.5 2.1 2.8 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
 
A mid-term convergence assessment in 2002 revealed that despite some achievements 
by WAMZ member countries, these were not adequate enough support the take-off of the 
monetary union in January 2003. A major problem was the inadequate commitment of 
member countries of WAMZ to support their commitment expressed with actions. This 
consequently led to the extension of the WAMZ programme to 30 June, 2005 so that the 
common central bank and the common currency would take off on 1 July 2005. Another 
deadline of 31 December, 2009 was set so that the single currency and the common 
central bank would be effective from 1 January 2010. Due to same reasons this could not 
be met. The official reason for this action was stated as "the global economic and financial 
crisis which has put constraints on member state's ability to meet the convergence 
criteria individually and collectively". The last agreed take off date of 1 January 2015 
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actually became unrealistic thus bringing about heavy cloud over the take-off of the 
monetary union.1 It is necessary to state that as at date, the WAMZ has no take-off date. 
Tables 1 above exhibits the year-by-year attainments of the primary convergence criteria 
by the six WAMZ countries over the thirteen-year convergence period spanning from 
2000 to 2014. The summary of the three-year (2012-2014) averages of the achievements 
of these primary criteria are presented in the first segment of Table 2. Further in Tables 
2, the country-by-country achievements of five secondary convergence criteria by the 
WAMZ countries over a 13-year period (2010-2013) are displayed. On comparative basis, 
Tables 3 below shows the rankings of the WAMZ countries regarding the meeting of the 
primary and secondary convergence criteria over the 3-year periods of assessments 
while the ranking of the 3-year averages over the period of 13 years are as displayed in 
Table 4. Nigeria and Guinea respectively achieved the number one spots in the 
achievements of the primary and secondary convergence criteria while Ghana and Sierra 
Leone took the last position in each category, respectively. In general, for both the 
primary and secondary convergence criteria over the 3-year period, Nigeria gets the 
number one ranking as Ghana and Sierra Leone share the position at the bottom of the 
table.  
Table 2: 3-year Averages of Convergence Indicators Attainments by WAMZ Members 
3-year Average of Primary Convergence Indicators (2012-2014) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Budget Deficit/GDP (≤4%)  
5.7 
 
6.8 
 
3.5 
 
-2.4 
 
2.1 
 
3.5 
Inflation Rates (≤5%) 5.2 12.1 12.2 8.4 9.5 10.1 
Central Bank 
Financing(≤10%) 
 
20.7 
 
6.7 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
2.5 
Gross External Reserves 
(≥6 months) 
 
4.2 
 
2.6 
 
3.2 
 
2.5 
 
8.6 
 
2.4 
3-year Average of Secondary Convergence Indicators (2010-2013) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Tax Revenue/GDP 
(≥20%) 
 
13.6 
 
16.9 
 
17.1 
 
24.2 
 
12.8 
 
9.8 
Wage Bill/Tax Revenue 
(≤35%) 
 
44.4 
 
46.6 
 
28.7 
 
47.4 
 
38.0 
 
58.2 
Public Investment/Tax 
Revenue (≥20%) 
 
7.7 
 
14.7 
 
27.8 
 
13.6 
 
17.7 
 
26.6 
Real Interest Rates (> 0)  
4.5 
 
8.5 
 
2.2 
 
-6.8 
 
-6.5 
 
-7.7 
Stability of Real Exchange 
Rate (± 5%) 
 
-4.5 
 
-10.2 
 
-5.6 
 
-4.7 
 
-1.1 
 
5.4 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 From all indications, the WAMZ member countries found it difficult to meet the convergence criteria. 
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Table 3: Rankings of the Attainments of the Convergence Indicators by WAMZ Members 
Rankings of the 3-year Average of Primary Convergence Indicators (2012-2014) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Budget 
Deficit/GDP 
5 6 3 1 2 3 
Inflation 
Rates 
1 5 6 2 3 4 
Central Bank 
Financing 
6 5 1 1 1 4 
Gross 
External 
Reserves 
2 4 3 5 1 6 
Member 
Country's 
Total 
14 20 13 9 7 17 
Overall 
Ranking 
4th 6th 3rd 2nd 1st 5th 
Rankings of the 3-year Average of Secondary Nominal Convergence Indicators (2011-2013) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Tax Revenue/ 
GDP 
4 3 2 1 5 6 
Wage Bill/Tax 
Revenue 
3 4 1 5 2 6 
Public 
Investment/Tax 
Revenue 
 
6 
 
4 
 
1 
 
5 
 
3 
 
2 
Real Interest 
Rates 
2 1 3 5 4 6 
Stability of Real 
Exchange Rate 
3 6 5 4 2 1 
Member 
Country's Total 
18 18 12 20 16 21 
Overall Ranking 3rd 3rd 1st 5th 2nd 6th 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
 
Table 4: Rankings of the 3-year Average of General (Primary and Secondary) Convergence Indicators (2010-
2012) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Budget 
Deficit/GDP 
5 6 3 1 2 3 
Inflation Rates 1 5 6 2 3 4 
Central Bank 
Financing 
6 5 1 1 1 4 
Gross External 
Reserves 
2 4 3 5 1 6 
Tax Revenue/ 
GDP 
4 3 2 1 5 6 
Wage Bill/Tax 
Revenue 
3 4 1 5 2 6 
Public 
Investment/Tax 
Revenue 
 
6 
 
4 
 
1 
 
5 
 
3 
 
2 
Real Interest 
Rates 
2 1 3 5 4 6 
Stability of Real 
Exchange Rate 
3 6 5 4 2 1 
Member 
Country's Total 
32 38 25 29 23 38 
Overall Ranking 4th 5th 2nd 3rd 1st 5th 
Source: West African Monetary Agency and Author's Calculations 
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Within the convergence indictors' context, these ranking demonstrates the readiness of 
the six WAMZ countries for the currency union, from the most-ready (the top ranked) 
and the least-ready (the low-ranked). The WAMZ’s single currency failed to take-off and was postponed on three occasions in 
2003, 2005 and 2009. In July 2014, due to lack of economic convergence among the 
WAMZ members, as well as apparent inadequate preparations, glaringly reflecting non-
feasibility of the January 2015 take-off,  the WAMZ gave up the introduction of the single 
currency as proposed and the Heads of States and Governments of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) changed focus and strategy by 
relinquishing the initial plan of the WAMZ-WAEMU merger and replacing this with 
rescheduling the creation of a single currency for the 15-member ECOWAS countries by 
January 2020.  
In the bid to accelerate the pace for the introduction of the West African single currency, 
the Presidential Task Force set up by the Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS 
considered three options (as displayed in Table 5 below) and eventually recommended 
that Option 2 (The Gradual Option) be adopted. The Gradual Option highlighted that the 
participation of countries in the single currency will be based on compliance with the 
primary convergence criteria before 2020. 
Table 5: Options for Single Currency in ECOWAS 
 Options Highlights 
Option 1 
 
 
Big Bang 
By 2020, all ECOWAS member countries will participate in the 
single currency; and countries that cannot meet the 
convergence criteria ex-ante will achieve these ex-post. 
Option 2 
 
 
Gradualist 
Member countries of ECOWAS that are able to meet the 
primary convergence criteria before 2020 will participate in 
the single currency. 
Option 3 
 
 
Critical Mass 
The launching of the single currency will take place in 2020 on 
the condition that the critical mass of countries representing at least 75% of the region’s GDP 
Source: ECOWAS Commission The Task Force rejected Option 1 and Option 3 because of the apparent ‘too high’ levels 
of risks relating to macroeconomic instability if these two options are adopted. Given the 
present situations in the West Africa region, Table 6 below reflects four possible 
convergence situations that can result in 2020. 
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Table 6: Possible Convergence Situation in ECOWAS by 2020  
Convergence Situation Possible Qualifying Countries Possible Outcomes 
Situation 1  
WAEMU countries 
Current status-quo, leading to a fresh 
postponement of the ECOWAS single 
currency. 
Situation 2 WAEMU countries + Nigeria + 
Ghana + few other WAMZ 
Countries 
Launching of ECOWAS single 
currency. 
Situation 3 WAEMU countries + WAMZ 
countries, but without Nigeria and 
Ghana. 
Fresh postponement of the ECOWAS 
single currency because of the need 
to grant more time for the exclusion 
of the two economic heavy weights 
(Nigeria and Ghana). 
Situation 4 WAEMU countries + WAMZ 
countries 
Launching of the ECOWAS single 
currency. 
Source: Bakoup and Ndoye (2016) 
In order to meet the January 2020 deadline and the launching of the single currency as 
scheduled, those critical measures that were not well addressed in the past were 
highlighted for full implementation before 2017. These were: (a) preparing a strategy and 
procedures for the future single currency of the ECOWAS monetary integration; (b) 
drafting a treaty that will establish the monetary union between member countries of 
ECOWAS and for all members to ratify this treaty; (c) designing, adopting and ratifying 
the Article of Association of the future common central bank for ECOWAS. In May 2015, 
there was the rationalisation of the total number of convergence criteria from eleven to 
six, consisting of four primary criteria and two secondary criteria. These modifications 
also involved the reviews and changes in some benchmarks. The new primary criteria 
are: (i) ratio of budget deficit (commitment basis, including grants) to GDP of less than or 
equal to 3%2; (ii) average annual inflation rate of less than 10%3; (iii) central bank financing of budget deficit of less than or equal to 10% of the previous year’s tax revenue; 
and (iv) gross external reserves - higher than or equal to 3 months of imports4. The new 
secondary criteria:5 (a) stable nominal exchange rate of +/- 10%; and (b) ratio of total 
public debt to GDP of not more than 70%. 
Similarities in inflation is one of the properties of an optimum currency area (OCA). 
Literatures on inflation (as a property of an OCA) have been able to spell out the 
                                                          
2
 Previously, the maximum target for budget deficit/GDP ratio was 4% (excluding grants). 
3
 This is against the former maximum of 5%. 
4
 The previous cover was 6 months.  
5
 Criteria removed in the rationalisation exercise were: positive real interest rate, real exchange rate stability, non-
accumulation of domestic and external arrears, tax revenue/GDP, wage bill/tax revenue and public investments/tax revenue.  
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implications of inflation rates similarities among members or would- be members of a 
monetary union. It is against this background that this paper, examined the homogeneity 
in the patterns of inflation and the degree of inflation deviations from benchmarks set for 
the assessment.  These evaluate the feasibility of monetary integration of the WAMZ. 
2. Optimum Currency Area (OCA) Properties and Theoretical Underpinnings  
There are so many definition of an optimum currency area given in literature.  One can 
describe an optimum currency area as a domain within which exchange rates are fixed 
and monetary policy best maintain full employment, balanced international payments 
and a stable internal average price. It is an area that for optimal balance adjustments and 
effectiveness of domestic macroeconomic policy, has fixed exchange rates within the area 
but maintain flexible exchange rates with trading partners. It is a geographical region in 
which economic efficiencies are shared and huge economic benefits are created by a 
single currency; a region in which the benefits of forming a monetary union outweigh the 
cost. It is also a geographical and economic domain that operates one currency and one 
monetary policy operates and have a general means of payments either a single currency 
or several currencies whose exchange value are immutably pegged to one another with 
unlimited convertibility for both current and capital market transactions, but whose 
exchange rate fluctuate in unison against the rest of the world. 
The history of the theory of optimum currency area (OCA) dates back to early 1960s when 
the criteria that should gauge the optimality of a region to have a single currency, thus 
forming a common currency area (OCA) was first formulated by Robert Mundell in 1961 
and further developed significantly by Ronald McKinnon in 1963 and Peter Kenen in 
1969. According to Krahi (2010), these three men contributed the main pieces for an 
academic debate where common notion has not been found yet, thus making the theory 
of optimal currency area an unfinished puzzle. In spite of the fact Robert Mundell is 
known as the father of the theory of optimum currency area, having formulated and 
named the theory, he was not the first to delve on the issue within the idea of the theory.  
The development of the optimum currency area concept came in the context of the 
discussions of the relative advantages of the fixed exchange rate regime over the flexible 
exchange rate regime. During the early part of the Bretton Wood System, economists 
from many angles had various discussions which centre on the result and effect of the 
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fixed exchange regime; and some of their conclusion influenced the theory of optimum 
currency area (OCA). According to Mongelli (2005: 608), the OCA theory was developed 
when the Bretton Wood System of fixed exchange was still in operation. What Mundell 
tried to do was to determine if it would be optimal for currency of countries to float freely 
(Mundell, 1961). The predominant focus of Mundell is on areas with a single currency in 
which the control of money supply would be in the hands of one central bank.  
In agreement with Cesarano (2006), discussions on the OCA theory and field associated with it can be categorised into two namely: the Friedman’s View on one hand and the 
positions of Mundell, Mckinnon and Kenen on the other hand. Though, regarded as two 
groups of opinions, Kawai (1987) however sees Friedman to have opted for flexible 
exchange rate while Dellas and Tavlas (2009) see Friedman as having a critical view on 
policies that brings stabilization at the domestic level in accordance with the traditions 
of Keynesian economists. In the 1950s, it was generally assumed that Friedman called for 
flexible exchange rate regime. Boyer (2009) however regarded Friedman as the man who 
laid foundation for the subsequent theory of optimum currency area. 
There are two major phases of contributions to the theory of optimum currency area: 
Pioneering Phase (first wave) and Cost-benefit Phase (second wave).  In the Pioneering 
Phase Robert Mundell (1961), Ronald McKinnon (1963) and Peter Kenen (1969) are the 
important authors regarded as the traditional contributors of the OCA theory. Notable 
authors and contributors in the Cost-benefit Phase (second wave) are Corden (1972), 
Ishiyama (1975), Tower and Willet (1976) and Mundell (1973). Three major properties 
of the OCA theory are: 
Property 1 - Labour Mobility and Wage Flexibility: These are contributions by Robert 
Mundell (1961) Robert Mundell is the initial contributor to the theory of optimum 
currency area in 1961 when he identified factor mobility as the strategic attribute of an 
optimum currency area. 
Property 2 - Size and Openness of the Economy: These are the contributions made by 
Ronald McKinnon (1963): Ronald McKinnon is a second major contributor to the theory 
of optimum currency area as he emphasises on the size and the degree of openness of an 
economy as a factor that is crucial in a currency area that is optimal.6 
                                                          
6This is the second major OCA criterion added by McKinnon The first criterion by Robert Mundell in 1961 is mobility 
of labour and flexibility of wages saying that if labour can easily move from a country that is negatively affected, to a 
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Property 3 - Diversification of Production: These are contributions by Peter Kenen (1969). In 1969, Peter Kenen introduced ‘Product Diversification’ as a more relevant criterion of 
an optimum currency area. Kenen (1969) says that with “diversity in a nation’s product 
mix, the number of single product regions contained in a single country may be more relevant than labour mobility”. 
Right from the early 1960s when the theory of optimum currency area came to limelight, 
several authors, through their various seminal contributions have been able to come up 
with various properties of an optimum currency area. Most of these properties, which 
many regarded as prerequisites, features attributes or criteria of an optimum currency 
area are summarised in the Box 1 below: 
Box 1: Properties/Criteria of an Optimum Currency Area and Implications 
Properties/Criteria Implications 
Flexibility of Nominal Wages and 
Price (Friedman, 1963) 
Flexibility of wages and prices within/between members of a common currency 
area will make asymmetric shocks to be overcome easily because the movement 
adjusting for the shocks will not be linked with inflation in one country and/or 
sustained unemployment in another and thus bringing in higher degree of stability 
in the common currency area  
Mobility of Factors of Production - 
Including labour (Mundell, 1961) 
There will be reduction in the need to alter real factor prices and nominal exchange 
rate between member countries when responding to disturbances, if factors of 
production are mobile within the common currency area, even if factor costs are 
rigid.  
It will be more difficult to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime when the capital 
mobility is higher.  
Simply put, adjustments to asymmetric shock are facilitated and the pressures for 
adjustments in exchange rates are reduced when the degree of labour mobility is 
high. 
Degree Openness of the Economy 
(McKinnon, 1963) 
The higher the degree of economic openness of a member country of a common 
currency area, the more the likelihood of the transmission of the changes in 
international prices of tradables to domestic prices. 
If the higher share of domestic outputs of a country are generated from trades 
within the common currency area, such country will benefit from membership of 
the currency union. 
Size of the Economy (McKinnon, 
1963) 
Large economies have the tendencies to be attracted by the flexible exchange rate 
regime implying that medium or small-sized countries find fixed exchange rate 
regime (as desired by monetary union) attractive. 
Diversification of Production, 
Exports and Consumption (Kenen, 
1969) 
The higher the diversification of production and consumption by member 
countries of a currency union, the more likely the reduction in costs due from 
discarding nominal exchange rate changes between these countries, thus finding a 
common currency as valuable.  
The impact of shocks that are specific to a particular sector of the economy would 
be diluted by high level of diversification in production and consumption.  
Consequently, diversification shields economy against series of disturbances and 
causes reduction in the needs for changes in terms of trade through nominal 
exchange rate.  
 
Similarities in Inflation or 
Differences in Inflation (Fleming, 
1971) 
It is more difficult to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime in situations of inflation 
rate differentials between member countries of a common currency area.  
External imbalances can crop up due to continuous differences in inflation rates of 
nations within the common currency area.  
Terms of trade will remain fairly stable when Inflation rates between countries are 
similar over time and at the same time low. 
                                                          
country that is positively affected, any asymmetric shock between these countries would be outweighed while any 
central bank policy would be made redundant.  
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Fiscal Integration (Kenen, 1969, 
De Bandt & Mongelli, 2000) 
When countries share supranational fiscal transfer system in redistributing funds 
to those member countries that are affected by adverse asymmetric shocks, such 
countries would also have smooth adjustments to such negative shocks and would 
require reduced adjustments in nominal exchange rate.   
This fiscal integration requires the needs to share the risks involved and 
necessitates a high level of political integration.  
Asymmetric shocks are counteracted through fiscal transfers – (When there are 
shocks,  affecting  particular member countries within a common currency area in 
different ways, fiscal transfers from prosperous member countries to non-
prosperous member countries would counteract the effects of the shocks).  
High degree of policy integration leads to low inflation. 
Political Integration (Mintz 1970; 
Harberler, 1970; and Cohen, 1993)  
Several authors see economic integration to be so far in front of political 
integration.  
The political determination of countries to integrate is a significant condition for 
sharing a common currency.  
Cooperation on common economic matters, adherence to joint commitments, and 
more international linkage will all be strengthened and enhanced by political will 
of member nations within the common currency area.  
In transforming a group of nations to a successful common currency area, it 
essential that there is similarity of attitudes to politics and policies among member 
countries of the common currency area. 
Financial Market Integration 
(Ingram, 1962) 
The higher the level of financial integration, the greater the extent of the need to 
establish an optimum currency area across geographical blocs.  
The need for exchange rate adjustments can be reduced by financial market 
integration.  
Through capital market inflows, temporary adverse disturbances can be 
cushioned.  
With financial market integration, there will be reduction in the need to change 
inter-regional or intra currency area terms of trade through fluctuations in 
exchange rate.  
For the sustainability of a successful common currency area, tight financial market 
integration is essential. 
Similarities of Shocks and 
Similarities in Policy Responses 
to the Shocks (Bayoumi & 
Eichengreen, 1997; Masson 
&Taylor, 1993; Demertizis, Hughes 
&Rummel, 2000; Alesina, Barro & 
Tenreyro, 2002. 
If member countries of an optimum currency area record similarities in demand 
and supply shocks and the speed of at which their respective economy adjust as 
well as the speed of policy responses, there will be loss of monetary policy 
autonomy and fall in the cost of loss of direct control over the nominal exchange 
rate.  
Member countries of an optimum currency area showing large co-movements of 
output and prices would incur the lowest cost of dumping monetary independence 
vis-a-vis other member countries.  
This implying that the higher the similarities in shocks between members of a 
common currency area, the lower the costs of losing independence monetary 
policy. 
Similarities in Monetary Policy 
Transmission (Angeloni, Kashyap, 
Mojon and Terlizzese, 2001) 
Similarities in monetary transmission mechanism among member countries of an 
optimum currency area speak volume about the similarities in financial structures 
of these countries.  
External Nominal Shocks Fixed exchange rate regime will not be attractive to a potential member of an 
optimum currency area, if such country faces external nominal shocks. A flexible 
exchange rate system would be more appropriate. 
Monetary Shocks Fixed exchange rate regime will be more attractive to a potential member of an 
optimum currency area, if such country faces monetary shocks. A flexible exchange 
rate system would not be attractive. 
Real Shocks Fixed exchange rate regime will not be attractive to a potential member of an 
optimum currency area if such country faces real shocks. A flexible exchange rate 
system would be more appropriate. 
Business Cycle Synchronisation  Flexible exchange rate regime will not be appropriate if the group of countries 
forming an optimum currency area has synchronised business cycle. 
 
Central Bank’s Credibility 
If the central banks of the prospective member of a common currency area lack the 
credibility to moderate inflation, fixed exchange rate regime would be more 
advantageous, rather than flexible exchange rate. 
Monetary Policy Effectiveness For a prospective member of a common currency area, the cost of monetary independence is low (and not a high cost) such country’s monetary policy is 
ineffective.  Sources: Author’s compilations 
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Within the literature, there are many criteria for deciding how suitable countries are for 
an optimum currency area. However, the general agreement among the proponents7 of ‘optimum currency area’ is that in such region, labour is very mobile while economies are 
faced with same forms of economic shocks. The assertion of the OCA literature is that if 
two or more countries are to share the same currency without experiencing negative 
effects, it is necessary and sufficient to meet the OCA criteria. This is a position grounded 
with the assumption that nominal exchange rates are very effective; otherwise countries 
should not abandon their currencies since it would be meaningless to do so. As a major 
macroeconomic stabiliser, exchange rate affects relative prices of all goods, terms of trade 
and wages. Therefore, it is necessary for countries coming together to form a monetary 
union to have some conditions in place so that the functioning of nominal exchange rates 
to be less fascination or attractive as an adjustment tool. 
Similarities in inflation is one of the properties of an optimum currency area (OCA). 
Literatures on inflation (as a property of an OCA) have been able to spell out the 
implications of inflation rates similarities among members or would- be members of a 
monetary union. Fleming (1971) stressed that if a common currency area has differences 
in the trends of inflation rates among its member countries, there would be more 
difficulties in maintaining the fixed exchange rate regime as required of a monetary union 
due to the underlying general price level persistence behaviour and variability factor. 
Apart from this, the heterogeneous inflation patterns in a monetary union can propel 
external imbalances and at the same time, lead to unstable terms of trade. However, if 
terms of trade in member countries are stable, the need for various individual exchange 
rate in the currency union would be down played. Further emphasis of inflation 
convergence was made by Mundell (2000) who asserted the importance of inflation rate 
similarities for a currency union in fixing exchange rate easily 
Dissimilarities in inflation rate connote strong signals of differences in economic structures and in the conducts of individual country’s economy and if these inflation 
dissimilarities becomes wider and persistence, this has an implication of 'one size does 
not fit all'. Additional point in favour of the essence of inflation rates similarities for a 
currency union is the presumable low cost of being a member of the union because fiscal 
and monetary stance similarities are the root causes of inflation similarities. Divergences 
                                                          
7
 Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), Gosh and Wolf (1994), Frankel and Rose (1998) and 
Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) 
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in the inflation rates will make currency union members to face 'real interest rate 
differentials'. The high inflation member countries with sound economic growth may 
take advantage of the implied 'low interest rate' which further stimulates those 
economies concerned, but to the disadvantage of the low inflation-low growth member 
countries.  
Members of the WAMZ that decided to participate in the monetary zone will eventually 
abandon their national currencies; lose the control of their respective national monetary 
policies and fix their nominal exchange rates in relation to each other. From that date, the 
WAMZ member countries will neither be able to change short term interest rates nor 
change exchange rates (price of their currencies). They will no more be able to determine 
the quantity of money within their respective economies.  
As alternative to exchange rate, for countries in this category, only factor mobility (capital 
mobility and labour mobility) and wage flexibility will remain the main adjustment 
mechanisms.   
The loss of the ability of a member of a monetary union (like WAMZ countries) to operate 
national monetary and exchange rate policies independently in the presence of 
asymmetric shocks will be a cost of monetary union to these countries. However, the 
West African Monetary Zone will be an optimum currency area if the benefits that the six 
member countries will receive for joining the monetary union will outstrip or outweigh 
the costs of being in the union. The key concern for the proposed monetary cooperation 
within the WAMZ is the uniformity in inflation and output growth dynamics and the 
responses of these macroeconomic indicators to shocks and whether this will affect 
member countries in the same manner. Therefore if a WAMZ member country has large 
asymmetric (country-specific) shock and there is no appropriate adjustment mechanism, 
such country should not join the common currency area; and if this apply to a group of 
countries planning to go onto monetary union, it is not advisable for such group of 
countries to create a common currency union. This is because of the cost of maintaining 
a fixed exchange rate which would outweigh the benefits of such fixed exchange regime.  
 
3. Review of Literature Empirical Studies Literature on OCA Perspectives of 
WAMZ Monetary Integration 
From the perspectives of the properties of OCA, a few number of empirical studies have 
evaluated the feasibility of the monetary integration of the WAMZ as well as the viability 
of the membership of the proposed monetary union for prospective member countries. 
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Findings and results of some of these empirical researches are discussed in this section. 
An evaluation of the economic rationale for monetary union in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
performed by Benassy-Quere and Coupet (2003) through the use of cluster analyses of a 
sample of 17 countries by adapting variables emanating from the OCA theory (and the 
fear-of-floating literature) to conclude that the creation of the WAMZ around Nigeria is 
not supported by data. The result however, supported the inclusion of The Gambia, Ghana 
and Sierra Leone in an extended WAEMU arrangement or creation of a separate monetary union with the ‘core’ of the WAEMU and The Gambia. Further to this study by Benassy-
Quere and Coupet (2003), Bankage (2008) used the methodology initiated by Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1997) to compute OCA indices for 21 African countries. This study got 
a high predicted volatility for Nigeria in relation to other ECOWAS countries, leading to 
the suggestion that the inclusion of Nigeria in the WAMZ (and in the extended WAEMU) 
is not suitable according to the OCA theory. Cham (2011) assessed the feasibility of the 
WAMZ as a monetary zone using the combination of both macroeconomic convergence 
and the OCA properties (openness, shock synchronisation and labour mobility) to gather 
evidence towards concluding that the degree of labour mobility is low, shocks were not 
synchronised and the degree of openness of members (apart from The Gambia and 
Nigeria) were below average. Omotor and Niringiye (2011) used simple bivariate of vector autoregressive model to assess WAMZ’s feasibility as an OCA from the perspective 
of economic shocks and got results suggesting that the WAMZ is feasible to form an OCA. 
Coleman (2011) investigated business cycle synchronisation in five member countries of 
the WAMZ (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) applying Pearson 
correlation of trend and cyclical component of GDP to investigate co-movements at high 
frequencies between computed Z-scores for pairings of the five candidate countries. The 
results indicated lack of a consistent pattern of synchronised growth cycles which raised 
concerns over economic sustainability of the WAMZ. With the application of 
cointegration and fractional cointegration methods, inflation dynamics and common 
tendencies of real GDP of the WAMZ countries were investigated by Alagidede et al. 
(2012) to gather evidence of substantial heterogeneities in these respects, across the 
WAMZ.  Raji (2012) applied dynamic GMM and cross country correlation to assessed the 
real exchange rate misalignments and economic performance of the WAMZ to determine 
the implications of these for economic unionisation of the WAMZ to conclude that the 
WAMZ experiences asymmetrical correlations between real exchange rate 
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misalignments and economic performances. The cross-country correlation test however 
revealed moderate degree of symmetrical relationship using some macroeconomic 
variables such as real exchange rate, misaligned real exchange rate, openness, inflation 
and output. Costs and benefits of a common currency in the WAMZ were estimated by 
Okafor (2013) by means of behavioural models to capture costs elements (asymmetric 
shocks, loss of monetary autonomy, fiscal distortion) and benefits (trade creation, 
financial integration effects and policy coordination gain)  to yield evidences towards  
suggesting that potential benefits of common currency in the WAMZ will likely be lower 
than marginal costs due to loss of monetary policy sovereignty which could be 
monumental in spite of extended trade creation benefits. In a correlation investigation of 
structural shocks across the WAMZ, Harvey and Cushing (2015) concluded that the 
WAMZ countries responded asymmetrically to common supply, demand and monetary 
shocks and so, will respond differently to a common monetary policy. Assessments of the 
extent of convergence and business cycle synchronisation of business cycles within the 
WAMZ was performed by Alagidede and Tweneboah (2015) in the analyses of growth 
rate convergence. The results gathered suggested dissimilarities in business cycles within the WAMZ. Analyses of trade within the WAMZ and WAMZ’s trade with other countries 
with West Africa, Europe and Asia were made by Mensah (2016) who found strong 
evidence against trade symmetry in the WAMZ as well as some evidences of marginal 
convergence in inflation, real GDP growth and monetary policy rate, with reasons to infer 
that partial convergence in the WAMZ as well as significantly low trade within the WAMZ 
and the WAMZ countries with outside world.  
From monetary and macroeconomic stability perspectives, Balogun (2007) came up with 
a conjecture testing the ineffectiveness of the influence of independent monetary and 
exchange rate policies on domestic activities (particularly, output and inflation) in the 
WAMZ and the counter-productivity of these indicators. Findings from this study 
suggested that domestic monetary policy (captured by money supply and credits to 
government) hurt real domestic output, thus causing growth stagnation; and that further 
output expansion could not adequately dampen the fuelling effects of past inflation just 
as exchange rate devaluation had no effect on growth in the short run, but manifested in 
domestic inflation in the WAMZ. Balogun (2007) thus got evidence to draw conclusion 
that under an appropriate monetary union arrangement, the WAMZ countries (as a 
condition) would be better-off by surrendering their independence over monetary policy 
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instruments to the proposed regional body, just as adverse effects of interest rate on 
output was established contrary to theoretical proposition of inverse relationship. 
Coulibaly and Gnimassous (2013) also concurred with some previous literature on the 
exclusion of Nigeria from the proposed WAMZ or ECOWAS monetary integration in the 
assessment of the optimality of monetary union for the West African bloc, employing a ‘new estimation methodology catch-up’ co-movement between exchange rate 
misalignment as well as cluster analysis. 
Further evaluation of the WAMZ by Balogun (2009) examined the determinants of 
inflation differentials in a panel study of the WAMZ vis-à-vis the set macroeconomic 
convergence benchmark since 2000 when the plan to form the currency union 
commenced. In this study, empirical models based on the theoretical foundations of the 
New Keynesian underpinnings were estimated leading to the evidence (gathered from a 
stylised 5-country inflation rate differential model of the WAMZ) that the desired price 
stabilisation target could not be attained because the unweighted average regional 
inflation rates varied widely among the WAMZ countries and were often above the single 
digit target; and that the major monetary policy instruments determinants of inflationary 
divergence are in the pursuance of distortions in interest rates, exchange rates 
overvaluation and expansionary monetary policies. These led to the conclusion that the 
WAMZ countries have a very slim chance of attaining price convergence in the 
foreseeable future; and that these countries would be better-off conditionally on 
surrendering their inferior price stabilisation approach to a supranational monetary 
authority that would have the ability to enforce strict compliance with regional monetary 
and inflation targets.  The fiscal-monetary policy interaction analysis of Debrun et al 
(2005) gathered evident to prove that the monetary union proposed for the non-WAEMU 
bloc (principally, the WAMZ) is not feasible for member countries. Asongu (2013) applied 
granger causality analysis to examine the ‘embryonic African monetary zones’ at large, in a “short-run Schumpeterian trip”. The specific analysis of the WAMZ produced evidence to suggest that the WAMZ is not feasible as a monetary zone because of the ‘non-
traditional strand of monetary policy regimes for which appropriate policy instruments 
cannot be used in the short-run to offset adverse output disturbances. In further 
evaluation, Asongu (2014) employed GMM in a real, monetary and fiscal policy 
convergence analysis of the proposed African monetary unions as OCAs. The conclusion 
that the WAMZ was not feasible as a monetary zone was drawn due to the lack of real, 
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monetary and fiscal policy convergence, implying a substantial absence in the much desired ‘catch-up’ for policy harmonisation. 
In spite the reviewed body of literature on the OCA perspective of monetary integration 
of the WAMZ in this section, this paper enhanced the value of the compendium of 
empirical research works on the feasibility test through added knowledge in area of 
inflation deviation evaluation of monetary integration of the West African sub-region. 
 
4. Data and Methods:  
Annual data of consumer price index and GDP deflator inflation for the WAMZ countries, 
the United States (US) and the EMU employed here spans between 1980 and 2015. Data 
analyses were performed into six-fold. At first and second stages, analyses of the 
descriptive statistics and inflation correlation among the WAMZ countries were made. At 
the third stage of analyses, inflation convergence was investigated towards checking the 
feasibility of exchange fixation in the monetary zone through the measure of absolute 
inflation rate differentials generated by the deviations of the US and the Eurozone's 
inflation rates from the WAMZ's individual member's inflation rate.8 The differential 
inflation rates for each country were averaged over the periods covered. Low average 
inflation deviations translate into high level of inflation convergence. A WAMZ country 
exhibiting high differential inflation in these assessments are not feasible for exchange 
rate fixation with the US dollars or the euro (as appropriate).  
The absolute inflation rate differential measure of inflation convergence were generated 
for each WAMZ country as: 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐷 = 𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑈𝑆𝑡/𝐸𝑀𝑈𝑡                                                                    1 
where 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐷 is inflation differential, 𝜋𝑡  is the inflation rate for the assessed WAMZ 
country and 𝜋𝑈𝑆𝑡/𝐸𝑀𝑈𝑡 is the inflation rates for the US or EMU (as appropriate). Due to data 
constraints, these analyses were split into two sub periods: (i) the 12-year pre-
convergence period (1989-2000) and (ii) the 12-year period convergence period (2001-
2012). In the fourth aspect of analyses, differentials between WAMZ's member countries 
inflation rates and the reference value of 5% inflation rate (expressed as the convergence 
                                                          
8
 Absolute values of these deviations are taken in order to avoid the opposite sign value cancellations. 
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criterion) were estimated and evaluated. This assessed the degree of divergence from the 
inflation target of the future common central bank for the zone. These were estimated as: 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐷 = 𝜋𝑡 −  𝜋∗                                                                          2 
where 𝜋∗ is the convergence criterion policy inflation target rate of 5%. Inflation rate 
differential analyses under this approach cover the 12-year convergence period (2001-
2012). The fifth approach was to check inflation rates misalignments by calculating the 
annual inflation rate differentials as deviations from the WAMZ's average inflation over 
the convergence 12-year period of 2001 to 2012. These were generated as: 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐷𝐹 = 𝜋𝑡 −  𝜋𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝐴𝑉                                                                      3 
where:  𝜋𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝐴𝑉  is the average inflation rate for the WAMZ over the convergence period 
(2001-2012). Effort were made to analyse the correlation of the inflation differentials 
under the three approaches so as to establish similarities (or otherwise) inflation trends 
and patterns in the WAMZ countries. The sixth and final approach was to appraise the 
time series properties of the inflation rate deviations under the three approaches 
emphasising the deviations from the convergence benchmark of 5% inflation rate as this 
establishes if there are evidence of consistent/persistent impacts of idiosyncratic shocks 
that affects inflation rates in the WAMZ countries. Here, unit root tests were carried out 
to determine the order of integration of the inflation deviation and to reveal if they are 
stationary or not.  
5. Results and Findings:  
The pattern of the coefficients of variation of 4-periodic inflation are displayed in Figure 
1 below. Over the pre-convergence periods (1981-1990 and 1991-2000) and the 
convergence periods (2001-2010 and 2011-2015), it is interesting to note that the degree 
of dispersion subsided during the second phase of the convergence period despite higher 
degrees of dispersion in the previous three periods. Ghana recorded the lowest 
dispersion in this latter period. What happened during the last phase is a reflection of 
improvements in the convergence of inflation variations with the WAMZ.  
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 Figure 1: Inflation Periodic Coefficients of Variation for the WAMZ Countries  
 
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
Figure 2: WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from EMU and US Inflation Rates 
(Pre-convergence Period) 
 
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
Figure 3: WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from EMU and US Inflation Rates 
(Convergence Criteria Period) 
 
        Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
The results of inflation convergence investigated by the means of measuring absolute 
inflation rate differentials generated through deviations of the US and the Eurozone's 
inflation rates from the WAMZ's individual member's inflation rate are shown in Figures 
2 and 3 above.  
0
2
4
1981-1990 1990-2000 2001-2010 2011-2015
WAMZ Countries' Inflation Periodic Coefficients of Variation 
GAMBIA GHANA GUINEA LIBERIA NIGERIA S/LEONE
EMU Inflation Deviations
US Inflation Deviations
Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone
3.7 21.85 7.42
315.71
30.61 40.37
4.16 23.1 7.86
315.84
30.2 41.63
EMU Inflation Deviations US Inflation Deviations
EMU Inflation Deviations
US Inflation Deviations
Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone
6.57
16.32
14.33
7.94
12.93
10.25
6.91
16.52
14.09
7.73
12.87
10.01
EMU Inflation Deviations US Inflation Deviations
20 
 
It is necessary to state that high variation in Liberia during the 1991-2000 period was 
due to the 1998 huge war-time inflation of 3,737.22%. If this outlier is expunged from the country’s inflation estimation, the country’s position would have been much more 
different.  
Table 7: Correlation Matrix of WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from Eurozone Inflation Rates 
 Pre-convergence Criteria (PC)Period 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.12 1     
Guinea 0.65 -0.32 1    
Liberia -0.11 -0.42 -0.25 1   
Nigeria -0.14 0.40 0.07 -0.23 1  
Sierra Leone 0.74 -0.25 0.90 -0.15 0.004 1 
       
       Convergence Criteria (CC)Period 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.71 1     
Guinea -0.39 -0.65 1    
Liberia -0.13 0.01 -0.34 1   
Nigeria -0.23 -0.28 0.08 -0.18 1  
Sierra Leone -0.40 -0.63 0.33 -0.22 0.07 1 
       
       Sources: Author's Estimation, EIU Database and EViews 7 Output  
These exhibit the pattern and extent of inflation deviation of the WAMZ countries in 
terms of feasibility in exchange rate fixation with the euro and the US dollars. Simple 
interpretation of these results is that the lower the differential, the higher the inflation 
convergence with the respective currency (the euro/US dollar) and the stronger the 
argument in favour of exchange rate fixation with the respective currency. A country 
displaying high inflation deviation from these currencies is not feasible as a part of the 
monetary union, for exchange rate fixation with the single currency.   
An important feature of the results is the similarities in the Eurozone/US deviation 
results for the WAMZ countries displayed in Tables 7 and 8. In the pre-convergence 
period, The Gambia was the most feasible member of the proposed single currency for 
the euro and US dollar exchange rate fixation just as Liberia was the least feasible. In the 
convergence era, The Gambia was consistence with her number one ranking and Liberia 
moved up to the second position while Ghana is the least candidate for exchange rate 
fixation with the euro/US dollar. 
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Table 8: Correlation Matrix of WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from US Inflation Rates 
Pre-convergence Criteria (PC)Period 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.10 1     
Guinea 0.71 -0.36 1    
Liberia -0.28 -0.41 -0.20 1   
Nigeria 0.08 0.48 0.17 -0.37 1  
Sierra Leone 0.76 -0.27 0.90 -0.14 0.04 1 
       
Convergence Criteria (CC)Period 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.75 1     
Guinea -0.39 -0.66 1    
Liberia -0.11 0.02 -0.36 1   
Nigeria -0.17 -0.23 -0.01 -0.25 1  
Sierra Leone -0.40 -0.62 0.34 -0.19 -0.02 1 
       
Sources: Author's Estimation, EIU Database and EViews 7 Output 
 
Table 9: Correlation Matrix of WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from Convergence Criterion 
Inflation (5%) Rate (Convergence Criteria Period) 
 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.77 1     
Guinea -0.49 -0.61 1    
Liberia -0.25 -0.45 0.03 1   
Nigeria -0.24 -0.35 0.04 -0.07 1  
Sierra Leone -0.42 -0.63 0.52 0.19 -0.23 1 
       
Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database and Eviews 7 Output 
Table 9 above gives the correlation matrix of the deviation of the WAMZ countries' 
inflation rates from the target rate during the convergence period. The results revealed 
negative correlation among the WAMZ countries while those positive correlation were 
very weak. The correlation matrix of the target rate differentials in Table 10 below 
reflects many negative correlation coefficients indicating huge dissimilarities among the 
WAMZ countries in this regard.  
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Table 10: Correlation Matrix of WAMZ Countries' Inflation Deviations from WAMZ's Average Inflation 
(Convergence Criteria Period) 
 
 The Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The Gambia 1      
Ghana 0.66 1     
Guinea -0.42 -0.64 1    
Liberia -0.13 -0.54 0.15 1   
Nigeria -0.29 -0.13 -0.09 -0.28 1  
Sierra Leone -0.38 -0.65 0.54 0.24 -0.28 1 
       
       Sources: Author's Estimation and EIU Database 
Table 11: Ng-Perron Unit Root Tests on Deviations of WAMZ Inflation from Inflation in Eurozone and 
US. 
Pre-convergence Period (WAMZ/Eurozone) 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-2.433 
-18.332 
-2.277 
-5.419 
-5.453 
-6.414 
-1.012 
-3.026 
-1.026 
-1.642 
-1.651 
-1.708 
0.416 
0.165 
0.450 
0.303 
0.303 
0.266 
9.487 
1.340 
10.432 
4.531 
4.493 
4.054 
Non-stationary 
Stationary 
Non-stationary 
Non-stationary 
Non-stationary 
Non-stationary 
Pre-convergence Period (WAMZ/US) 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-2.321 
-16.730 
-2.880 
-5.419 
-5.420 
-6.519 
-1.016 
-2.891 
-1.175 
-1.641 
-1.646 
-1.722 
0.438 
0.173 
0.407 
0.303 
0.304 
0.264 
10.098 
1.468 
8.403 
4.532 
4.520 
3.998 
Not stationary 
Stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Convergence Period (WAMZ/Eurozone) 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-3.391 
-84.453 
-4.055 
-5.122 
-4.912 
-2.360 
-1.264 
-6.482 
-1.416 
-1.589 
-1.550 
-0.610 
0.373 
0.077 
0.349 
0.310 
0.315 
0.258 
7.177 
0.320 
6.045 
4.805 
50.19 
7.667 
Not stationary 
Stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Convergence Period (WAMZ/US) 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-3.321 
-141.086 
-4.017 
-5.189 
-3.811 
-1.652 
-1.246 
-8.387 
-1.409 
-1.601 
-1.362 
-0.444 
0.375 
0.059 
0.351 
0.308 
0.357 
0.268 
7.315 
0.191 
6.102 
4.742 
6.428 
8.426 
Not stationary 
Stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Source: Author's Computation, Eviews Output and EIU Database 
As the future common central bank for the WAMZ requires information on time series 
properties on inflation when giving future inflation targets and designing monetary 
policy, evidence of the unit root behaviour of the properties of inflation differentials 
under the three approaches in this study are exhibited in Tables 11 above and 12 and 13 
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below as derived from the Ng-Perron unit root tests with constant and trend at 5% 
significance level. 
Table 12: Results of Ng-Perron Unit Root Tests on Deviations of WAMZ Inflation from Convergence 
Criterion (5%) Inflation Rate 
Convergence Period Only 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-3.041 
-37.342 
-3.925 
-4.379 
-3.577 
-2.474 
-1.198 
-4.294 
-1.394 
-1.480 
-1.323 
-0.746 
0.394 
0.115 
0.355 
0.338 
0.370 
0.301 
7.965 
0.728 
6.243 
5.595 
6.840 
7.984 
Not stationary 
Not Stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
          Source: Author's Computation, Eviews Output and EIU Database 
Apart from Ghana under the deviation from euro/US dollar, these properties produce 
evidences that the null hypothesis of unit root could not be rejected under the four 
scenarios for all the WAMZ countries, implying non-stationary deviations suggesting that 
shocks to inflationary trends in the WAMZ would have permanent and long lasting effects 
on inflation rates in the zone as inflation may not return to the trend path overtime.  
Table 13: Ng-Perron Unit Root Tests on Deviations of WAMZ Inflation from WAMZ's Average 
Convergence Period Only 
Country MZa MZt MSB MPT Decision 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
-4.024 
-6.615 
-4.477 
-4.657 
-2.913 
-3.026 
-1.403 
-1.757 
-1.487 
-1.524 
-1.150 
-0.864 
0.348 
0.265 
0.332 
0.327 
0.395 
0.285 
6.096 
3.885 
5.484 
5.263 
8.232 
7.268 
Not stationary 
Not Stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Not stationary 
Ng-Perron 5% Critical Values 
MZa MZt MSB MPT 
-8.100 -1.980 0.233 3.170 
 
Source: Author's Computation, Eviews Output and EIU Database 
What these suggest is that the cost implications of following disinflationary policies in 
WAMZ countries may be high while it is very likely to be difficult forecasting or predicting 
future inflation movements which are based on past inflationary behaviours. These 
properties of integration of inflation rate differential are very revealing for inflation rate 
convergence among WAMZ member countries. 
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6. Conclusions 
From the background of OCA theory and inflation similarities property of the OCA theory, 
this research study investigated patterns of inflation deviations across the WAMZ. The 
Inflation differential analyses reveal the order at which WAMZ members are strong in the 
proposed common currency, exchange rate fixation with the US dollars or the euro, given 
low inflation differentials generated. The Gambia is at the top in both pre-convergence 
and post convergence periods. Liberia and Ghana are the bases in these two period 
respectively. Thus, The Gambia is the most country feasible for the exchange rate integration 
and fixation with the euro and the US dollars while Nigeria, the lead economy yielded 
unfavourable results in the inflation evaluation. The investigation of inflation deviation from 
convergence target of 5% results in non-stationarity of the deviations, suggesting that 
shocks to inflationary trends in the WAMZ would have permanent and long lasting effects 
on inflation rates in the zone as inflation may not return to the trend path overtime. This 
denote that the cost implications of following disinflationary policies in WAMZ countries 
may be high while it is very likely to be difficult forecasting or predicting future inflation 
movements which are based on past inflationary behaviours. 
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